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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This " ->o*i ^--m uiic \ '' , . « . . . ? . w.^t 
pnfprpi .. r a v n r * d e f e n 
was - i :qiuall\ * , . t?d n i t * - •: * .-iipreine • ^ * . r sua iv ' ; t a h 
s c c o r d r * 
R u l e s . . . v w J u r e , 
* ; • n * I.*M. was p<.'ur* 1 o v e ' * ' *' f Appea l s 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND.._STAN_DA_RD OF. REVIEW 
a p p e l l an t James Aragoi 1 ('""Aragon" ) i i i ai 1 acc iden t : a t work oi 1 
Df-cBTber 16 , 1985 1 ir agon sued Borden , I n c . ( Borden" ) E i Id 11s 
; i I • E: :! s i i b s :ii c:l :i a r ] • C l ::: •< a r C1 I I 1: F o o d s C o i i tp a i 1/5 ( ' C ] o e 1: 
w * - * - , T h e s e c 1 a i m s a 1: e b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r I n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a 
and by t he exc 111 s ii ve r ernedy p r ov i s i o 11 o f t he I It ah Wo r ke r s * 
""*-•- issu*4^ r a i s e d 1111 t h i s appea l a r e ; ^1 
1 ( II ( » 11 Ill III 11 1 mi 111 11 mi mi III 11 111111 mi 1 III 
auamst Borden cie L-aried by les judicata;1 the trial 
,* . — -orre-^ ?*- - *•- • ^r *'-* ng that »**' *r - "- ~s 
piovis. n ~i!' Code Ann, % i^-i-tvi $3 - -
abus its aiscr~* on J.H LCLUD - -"• - * j >•<-* summa ^iment 
niri^p *~n norm, raann fn rn .,. ^covpr* - some 
issues, when there were independent grounds to permit the entry of 
summary judgment and Aragon had failed to conduct the discovery 
requested for the previous eight months since the issues were 
initially raised, and for more than a year since the lawsuit was 
filed? 
The standard of review for the first two issues is a 
review of the trial court's legal conclusions on the basis of 
correctness. The standard of review for the third issue is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal may be resolved through application of the 
doctrine of res judicata. If the Court looks to additional 
grounds, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60, is determinative and is 
reproduced in Appendix A hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of an 
accident suffered by Aragon at Borden's Clover Club plant in 
Kaysville, Utah. Aragon asserts claims of negligence and strict 
liability against Clover Club, Borden and Casa Herrera, the 
manufacturer of the machine involved. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Aragon initially filed suit in federal court on 
November 10, 1989. (R. 512.) Clover Club and Borden filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of diversity. (R. 512-513.) That 
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mot ion was g r a n t e d and Aragon f i l e d * ~~" °~*-ion on Mav 1 1 inon 
:i i 1 s t a t e coi i r t , a] l eg a ng the same cause;- r - M « f • - . ' __ i 
i ! 1  igi i: • ill 28 1! 990 B : i:I • i: • i .d CI! :: i 
groi inds t h a t t h e sua t: was b a r r e d by * ue exi •• iv* f 
p r o v i s i o i i < * • nd«=>*i u * 
c ::: i it a :i: n lai f 
C i v i l P r o c e d u r e r>^t v i n e 1 * i p p u i t e d tn * **i . t dav i f 
A r a g o n ' s a t4 % 14 ^ 
all sc: i i: i :> ei I iiui'll; 
Burden hn:: clover LJI were agent? - f.ei \^. 123- xzb*) 
mi t a or - s m i s r * summa:< ^ o t i "*»ri 2lb-Z< 
(1 I 235 236 ) I L r e s p o n s e , Aragon a g a i n sou mance 
p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 6 ( f ) and f i l - l - : . ! a f f i d a v i t . r ! <. 
a t t o r n e y . (R. 2 5 4 - 2 5 6 , 2 9 0 - 2 9 3 . ^ -- - n i e u cm 
e x t e n s a ^ ^ m<=>moranflnm -in o p p o s i . . un^rv 
judgme:.* t . • mo t ion < * •. i an Sum o b j e c t i n r 
s e e ^ " rtWi''r ^ fl 'j- i-iits a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d by o u i u e n 
The moti::u t ; summa ' lament was argued MIL Julhi ' j! , 
i I I I 1 1 I HI I  II II II II I (I l II F II II ( » I II II II II I , I II , 
J - J ^iitered / . . Il IJL a n t i n g summary i iJiillijiiiu n t 
t e n l a n t s ( R , S(»4--"SIR d i npy i I I hat R u l i n q i s 
l ili|(iinii HI I 11 i i i l l i in i 11 in (in II i mi i II 
defendants on August 21, 1991. (R. 523-524.) Aragon sought a new 
trial concerning the Casa Herrera judgment, which was denied. 
(R. 526, 581-582.) The court heard further argument concerning 
the claims against Casa Herrera and on Novmeber 13, 1991, the 
court entered its order denying Aragon's motion and reaffirming 
the previous summary judgment order. (R. 586-588.) The notice of 
appeal was filed on December 12, 1991 (R. 595-596). 
Aragon has appealed the summary judgment rulings as to 
Borden and Casa Herrera, but does not dispute the summary judgment 
as to Clover Club. He now argues that Clover Club was his 
employer and is immune from suit due to the exclusive remedy 
provision. (Appellant's Brief at 33.) However, respecting 
Borden, he argues that there is a factual issue as to whether 
Borden was his employer and is therefore immune. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1983 Borden acquired Clover Club by purchasing all the 
issued and outstanding stock of Clover Club. (R. 267.) Since 
that time, Borden has totally directed and controlled the business 
operations at the Kaysville Clover Club facility. (R. 267.) On 
September 30, 1983, Borden, as sole shareholder of Clover Club, 
removed all of Clover Club's previous officers and directors and 
appointed officers and directors it selected. (R. 267, 271.) 
Borden also repealed all previous by-laws of Clover Club and 
adopted by-laws designated by Borden. (R. 267, 271.) Since 
September 30, 1983, all officers and directors of Clover Club have 
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been employees of Borden and have served at the absolute 
discretion of Borden. (R. 267.) 
For reason of product name identification, especially 
within the State of Utah, Borden has preserved and used the Clover 
Club trade name and its associated good will. (R. 268.) However, 
since 1983, Borden has maintained and operated Clover Club solely 
as a Borden profit center. (R. 268.) The revenues of the Clover 
Club profit center are part of the total revenues reflected on 
Borden's consolidated financial statements. (R. 268.) Clover 
Club does not issue separate financial statements, but rather 
reports all of its operating costs, revenues and financial 
information to Borden's corporate offices. (R. 268.) Clover Club 
does not have any separate business location or separate books or 
records concerning the Kaysville facility apart from Borden. 
(R. 243.) Clover Club has not filed any separate state or federal 
income tax returns since 1983 and the income generated by the 
Clover Club profit center has been included in Borden consolidated 
tax returns and all income taxes are paid by Borden. (R. 268.) 
There is no functional separateness between Clover Club and Borden 
at the Kaysville facility. (R. 268.) 
Since Borden purchased Clover Club, the payroll of the 
Clover Club profit center, including both hourly and salary 
payrolls, have been paid from bank accounts owned and controlled 
by Borden. (R. 268.) Borden pays the wages, salaries and 
benefits for all employees of the Clover Club profit center. 
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(R. 268.) All employees at the Kaysville facility participate in 
the same health insurance and other benefit plan program available 
to other Borden employees. (R. 268.) 
Plaintiff Aragon was on the payroll of Borden's Clover 
Club profit center from December 3, 1985 to December 16/ 1985. 
(R. 269.) Like all other employees there, he was paid by Borden, 
and his benefits were paid for by Borden. (R. 268-269.) 
At the time of Aragon*s injury in December 1985, Borden 
had purchased Workers' Compensation coverage from Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company. (R. 273.) Borden (not Clover Club) paid the 
insurance premiums to Liberty Mutual for its workers' compensation 
and employer's liability policy. (R. 269, 273.) Both Borden and 
Clover Club were named insureds on the policy. (R. 273.) 
On December 16, 1985, plaintiff Aragon was injured while 
he operated a machine known as a masa feeder owned by Borden at 
the Kaysville facility. (R. 8.) Aragon filed a claim for 
workers' compensation benefits concerning that accident. 
(R. 273.) As a result of that claim, plaintiff received 
compensation and other benefits from Liberty Mutual under the 
workers' compensation policy provided by Borden. (R. 273.) 
The Industrial Commission approved a Compensation 
Agreement concerning Aragon's workers' compensation claim. 
(R. 490, a copy of that Compensation Agreement is reproduced in 
Appendix C hereto.) The parties to this Agreement were Aragon as 
applicant, Clover Club Foods Company/Borden as employer, and 
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as insurance carrier. (R. 490.) 
The Compensation Agreement specifically states that Aragon was 
employed by "Clover Club Foods Company/Borden.w (R. 490.) The 
Compensation Agreement was signed by Aragon, and was approved by 
the Industrial Commission through Timothy C. Allen, Administrative 
Law Judge. (R. 490.) As part of the Compensation Agreement, 
Aragon's attorneys were paid an attorneys' fee, including his 
counsel in this action. (R. 490.) Aragon has never appealed that 
agreement, sought review of it, or in any way attempted to revoke 
his agreement or to challenge the Industrial Commission's finding 
that Borden was his employer at the time of his accident. 
In response to Borden's motion for summary judgment, 
Aragon admitted that the facts were not in dispute. (R. 302, 328.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Borden was correct. Aragon has already asserted and recovered on 
his claim against Borden concerning this injury and is barred by 
res judicata from seeking additional damages. Alternatively, the 
issue of who were Aragon's employers for purposes of workers' 
compensation has already been determined through the workers' 
compensation action, and Aragon is precluded from re-litigating 
that issue now. Borden was determined to be his employer, and so 
the dismissal pursuant to the exclusive remedy provision Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-60, was correct. 
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Even if the determination in the workers' compensation 
action did not bar Aragon's claim, the trial court's decision was 
correct. Strong public policy reasons compel the determination 
that Borden, who paid for Aragon's wages and compensation 
benefits, and who continues to be liable for workers' compensation 
benefits to Aragon, be shielded from additional claims and 
liability. It is also clear that applying the common law test, 
Borden qualifies as a common law employer for Aragon, and so is 
immune from suit. It had the right to control Aragon, it paid his 
wages, it paid for his benefits, and it provided his workers' 
compensation benefits. Alternatively, Borden must at least be 
considered a statutory employer of the applicant, and since it 
actually provided his workers' compensation benefits, it should be 
entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 
Finally, since the trial court found that both Clover 
Club and Borden employed Aragon (and Aragon contends that only 
Clover Club was the employer), at a minimum, Borden should be 
considered the agent of Clover Club since it paid the wages, and 
obtained and provided the benefits package on behalf of the 
"employees" of Clover Club, including workers' compensation 
benefits. As Clover Club's agent, Borden is entitled to the 
protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 
It is against public policy and the legislative intent of 
the exclusive remedy provision for an employer like Borden to pay 
the wages and pay for the workers' compensation benefits of 
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someone like Aragon and then be forced to be at risk for 
additional liability to Aragon concerning the same accident. This 
is exactly the type of case for which the exclusive remedy 
provision was intended to apply, and the summary judgment in favor 
of Borden should be affirmed. 
The denial of the Rule 56(f) motion was clearly within 
the discretion of the trial court and in any event that motion 
only sought to discover evidence relating to one issue in the 
case, that of alter ego. The court was correct in ruling on 
alternate grounds that Borden is entitled to the protection of the 
exclusive remedy provision. (R. 507.) Additionally, the 
plaintiff's failure to conduct the additional discovery it 
requested for eight months despite having previously requested and 
received a continuance to conduct this very discovery permits the 
denial of the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ARAGON1S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. 
The fact that Aragon obtained workers' compensation 
benefits from Borden pursuant to the Compensation Agreement 
precludes any liability of Borden in this action. Aragon sought 
and obtained workers' compensation benefits from Borden as a 
result of the December 1985 accident. Aragon's claims in this 
action arise from the same accident. In 1986, in response to the 
application for hearing which Aragon filed with the Industrial 
-9-
Commission, Liberty Mutual, Borden's insurance carrier, responded 
on behalf of both Clover Club and Borden. Subsequently, on 
August 14, 1989, the Industrial Commission approved a Compensation 
Agreement concerning this claim, which Agreement is attached as 
Appendix C. (R. 490.) In the caption of the Agreement, it 
recites that "Clover Club Foods/Borden" are Aragon's employers, 
and it again states in the body of the Agreement that Aragon was 
"employed by Clover Club Foods Company/Borden" at the time of the 
accident. As a result of the Compensation Agreement, Aragon was 
paid compensation benefits in excess of $16,000 and received 
medical benefits in excess of $45,000. All of these benefits were 
paid on behalf of Borden. 
Aragon signed the 1987 Compensation Agreement, which in 
two places recited that Borden was his employer. At the time the 
Agreement was signed and approved by the Industrial Commission, 
Aragon additionally was represented by two different law firms in 
his workers' compensation action. In fact, pursuant to the 
Compensation Agreement, his two sets of attorneys received an 
award of attorneys' fees. One of those attorneys is his counsel 
in this action. The Compensation Agreement was approved by the 
Industrial Commission through Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. 
Allen. The Compensation Agreement was not effective unless it was 
approved by the Industrial Commission. (R. 490.) 
Aragon agreed to the Compensation Agreement, and neither 
he nor his attorneys chose to dispute the determination that 
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Borden was his employer. Aragon never sought review or appeal of 
that determination nor did he ever seek to have it changed. 
Indeed, even at the time he filed the complaint in this action, 
and in each amended complaint he has filed thereafter, he has 
alleged that he was employed by "Borden or Clover Club" (R. 8, 73, 
113). He should not now be permitted to assert another claim 
against Borden arising out of his accident. 
A. Araaon Is Asserting the Same Claim Against Borden Which 
Was Already Litigated. 
As a result of Aragon's workers' compensation claim, he 
was awarded his statutory benefits against Borden, among others. 
It is undisputed that he received those benefits and that Borden 
paid the premium to provide those benefits. By this action he is 
attempting to recover for a second time the same benefits against 
Borden for the same injuries. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 shows that 
the tort remedies Aragon seeks in this case include everything 
recoverable under workers' compensation. That section 
1
 While Aragon admitted to the trial court that no facts were in 
dispute, R. 302, 328, he now argues at pp. 36-39 of his Brief that 
there is a factual issue as to whether Borden paid the workers' 
compensation benefits. The undisputed facts in the record are 
that Borden paid the premium, R.273, and that Aragon was paid on 
behalf of Borden and Clover Club, R. 273, 416. Aragon argues that 
since he was paid on behalf of Clover Club, there is a question as 
to whether he was paid on behalf of Borden. This is incorrect 
since the only evidence is that he was paid on behalf of both. 
This is consistent with the determination of both the Industrial 
Commission and of the trial court that Clover Club and Borden were 
his employers. Aragon's reliance on "inferences" which have no 
basis in the record or which are based on claimed bias of affiants 
when no objection was preserved below cannot, as a matter of law, 
give rise to any question of fact. 
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permits the employer or insurance carrier to assert claims against 
a third-party tortfeasor on behalf of the injured worker, or to 
assert a lien against any recovery obtained by the worker in such 
a third-party action. The statute permits the employer or 
insurance carrier to recover in full all payments made pursuant to 
the workers' compensation claim, less its proportionate share of 
the attorneys' fees. It would certainly be anomalous for Borden 
to pay the premiums for its workers' compensation coverage, and 
then, if an action were permitted to be maintained against Borden 
and recovery granted, to have to reimburse its insurance carrier 
for the very damages for which it purchased insurance. 
B. Res Judicata Applies to Acts of Administrative Agencies. 
It is clear that principles of res judicata may apply to 
acts of administrative agencies. See, e.g., Kirk v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
App. 1991); Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 621 (Utah 1983); A. Larson, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation Vol. 3, §§ 79.72(a), 79.72(d) (1989) 
(hereinafter "Larson") ("res judicata does apply to the decisions 
of compensation boards and commissions no less than to decisions 
of a court." § 79.72(a)) . 
The Utah Supreme Court made it clear in Utah Dept. of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission that 
administrative orders entered by consent or stipulation may also 
be acts in a judicial capacity so that principles of res judicata 
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apply. 658 P.2d at 621. In this case the Industrial Commission's 
decision, which awarded compensation in favor of Aragon and 
against Borden, is conclusive that Aragon was Borden's employee 
and he may not now seek another avenue of relief against Borden. 
Cases in other states support this result. For example, 
in Christian v. Pino De Laurentis Corp.. 58 A.D.2d 752, 396 
N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), the court held that: 
. . . having submitted a claim against 
defendant pursuant to the Workmen's 
Compensation Law and having accepted the 
benefits provided by an award thereunder, 
plaintiff may not now maintain an action for 
negligence against defendant alleging that he 
was at the time of his injury the employee of 
another. Since a workmen's compensation award 
was made, such constitutes a finding that 
plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the 
course of employment and is binding and 
conclusive until vacated or modified by direct 
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation 
Law. (Citations omitted.) 
396 N.Y.S.2d at 227. 
Similarly, in Westman v. Dessellier. 459 N.W.2d 545 
(N.D. 1990), the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the 
dismissal of an action against plaintiff's employer on the grounds 
that it had been previously determined in a workers' compensation 
action that the defendant was the plaintiff's employer: 
The decisions of administrative agencies, 
including those of the Bureau, may be res 
judicata even though administrative agencies 
are not courts. (Citations omitted.) 
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A prior decision of the Bureau is res judicata 
as to these same issues in a suit at law to 
recover for the same injury, whether the effect 
is to defeat the suit or to defeat a defense to 
the suit. 3A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, § 79.72(d). 
459 N.W.2d at 547. 
Aragon has already received his remedy from Borden. He 
may not now assert another claim against Borden; it is barred by 
res judicata. The trial court should be affirmed. 
II. THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
The res judicata argument in Point I is conclusive. 
There are also a number of other grounds to affirm the trial 
court's ruling based on the application of the exclusive remedy 
provision to Borden. Before examining them, it should be noted 
that there are no material facts in dispute which could preclude 
summary judgment. Aragon admitted as much to the trial court in 
his Summary of Memorandum contained in his Motion for Leave to 
File Overlength Memorandum, R. 302 ("the facts themselves are not 
in conflict . . .") and in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, R. 328 ("none of the facts presented to the court are 
disputed . . . " ) . The trial judge noted the same thing in his 
Ruling, R. 504, 507. 
Aragon now argues that inferences drawn from the 
undisputed facts give rise to a dispute which precludes summary 
judgment. Aragon's alleged "inferences" are based on assumptions 
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which have no basis in the record, e.g., that Clover Club 
reimbursed Borden for the workers' compensation premium, 
Appellant's Brief at 38. That simply is not supported by any 
facts, and is not an "inference" which creates a question of fact. 
Aragon also attacks the undisputed testimony of the 
affidavits submitted by Borden. This is clearly improper and 
cannot give rise to any question or concern regarding the evidence 
set forth in those affidavits. No objection to the affidavits or 
any motion to strike was ever made. Accordingly, any objection to 
the affidavits has been waived. D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 
420, 421 (Utah 1989); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040 1044 (Utah 1983) (even if affidavits in support of 
summary judgment were defective, party opposing summary judgment 
motion failed to move to strike and was deemed to have waived his 
opposition to evidentiary defects). Accordingly, any argument 
raised by Aragon concerning the facts set forth in the affidavits 
is irrelevant because any objection as to claimed problems with 
foundation, opinions, conclusions, or bias in those statements has 
been waived, and at this point those statements are undisputed 
facts. As Aragon admitted below to the court, there are no facts 
in dispute. As stated in Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390 (Utah 1980), summary judgment may be precluded only if a 
material fact is genuinely controverted. 
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III. BORDEN IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
PROVISION 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 provides that workers1 
compensation benefits are: 
• . . the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and . . . against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities 
. . . imposed shall be in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever . . . on 
account of any accident or injury . . . 
incurred by such employee in the course of 
• . . employment, and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer based upon any 
accident, injury or death of an employee. 
There is no dispute in this case that Aragon seeks to 
impose civil liability on Borden on account of injuries he 
suffered in the course of his employment. The undisputed facts 
show that Borden is entitled to the protection of § 35-1-60, which 
requires affirming the trial court's summary judgment. 
A. Aragon is Precluded From Re-litigating the Determination 
that Borden is His Employer. 
If the Court were to determine for some reason that res 
judicata does not apply here, it is clear that collateral estoppel 
or issue preclusion does apply and compels the conclusion that 
Borden was Aragon's employer and is therefore entitled to the 
protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 
The elements of collateral estoppel have been set forth 
by the Supreme Court as follows: 
The party invoking this doctrine must 
demonstrate the following: (1) the issue 
involved in the subsequent action is identical 
to the issue decided in the previous action; 
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(2) the issue is decided in a final judgment on 
the merits; (3) the issue was competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated in the first 
action; and (4) the party against whom the 
doctrine is invoked must be either a party to 
the first action or in privity with that party. 
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992). 
The relevant issue here is the identity of Aragon's 
employer(s). That same issue was crucial to the determination of 
Aragon's workers' compensation claim, as it is in every workers' 
compensation claim. Without a determination of who the employer 
is, there is no way to tell who is responsible for compensation 
benefits. The employment issue was decided in the workers' 
compensation action as reflected by the Compensation Agreement, 
which states twice that his employer was "Clover Club/Borden." 
R. 490. 
The Compensation Agreement constitutes a final judgment 
on the merits. It has the same effect as a final, unappealed 
from, decision of the Industrial Commission.2 This is consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. 
Public Service Comm., 658 P.2d at 621 (a consent order may be an 
act in a judicial capacity so as to give rise to res judicata 
effect). It is also consistent with the leading treatise in the 
1
 The fact that the Industrial Commission retains continuing 
jurisdiction over a workers' compensation claim in no way takes 
away from its status as a final judgment. See, e.g., Utah Dept. 
of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 21, note 31. 
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area. Professor Larson states that: wti]f the settlement is 
approved, it takes on the quality of an award . . .w 3 Larson, 
§ 82.62 (footnotes omitted). If Aragon or either of his two sets 
of attorneys felt that Borden or Clover Club should not properly 
have been deemed Aragon's employer, they could have and should 
have litigated the issue before the Industrial Commission. To the 
contrary, they all agreed. 
The issue was fully adjudicated. It was clearly 
addressed in the Compensation Agreement and was agreed to by the 
parties and approved by the Industrial Commission. If Aragon had 
wished to dispute the determination as to his employer, he had 
every opportunity to do so. Instead, the dispute was resolved and 
the issue was conclusively decided. 
Finally, it is obvious that Aragon, the plaintiff in this 
action, is the same as the applicant in the workers' compensation 
action. There is an absolute identity of parties. Each element 
of collateral estoppel is met here, and Aragon should be precluded 
from re-litigating the fact that Borden is his employer. 
This result is also supported by decisions elsewhere. In 
Lanqdon v. WEN Mgmt, Co., 147 A.D.2d 450, 537 N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989) the court concluded that the workers' compensation 
board's determination as to the identity of plaintiff's decedent's 
employer must be given collateral estoppel effect in the tort 
case. Langdon is strikingly similar to this action. There the 
Industrial Commission found that the deceased worker had been the 
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employee of two businesses. That determination was collateral 
estoppel to prevent the widow from seeking damages against either 
business. Similarly, Aragon should be precluded from proceeding 
against either Clover Club or Borden. Conversely, in Crawford v. 
Allied Container Corp., 561 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1989), the Maine 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the injured 
worker, stating that the defendant was collaterally estopped from 
claiming to be the injured worker's employer when the plaintiff's 
workers' compensation claim had been denied on the grounds that no 
employer/employee relationship existed between the parties. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to find that 
Aragon is precluded from re-litigating the identity of his 
employers. Summary judgment was correctly entered by the trial 
court. 
B. Public Policy Requires that Borden Be Given the 
Protection of the Exclusive Remedy Provision. 
Aragon's lawsuit raises the specter that Borden, who has 
already been determined to be Aragon's employer by the Industrial 
Commission, and who actually paid for Aragon's workers' 
compensation benefits, will also be subject to claims for damages 
arising out of the same accident, and to the expense of litigation 
over those claims. The purpose of the exclusive remedy provision, 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60, is precisely to avoid such double 
exposure, and to permit the parties who are liable under workers' 
compensation to avoid the expense and uncertainty of tort claims. 
-19-
Workers* compensation was enacted as a trade-off where 
the employer gave up the right to defend against certain claims, 
such as injuries caused by a worker's own negligence, and in turn 
pay statutorily established benefits through a relatively 
inexpensive administrative procedure. To permit Aragon's claim 
against Borden would undermine the purpose and intent of the law. 
The fundamental unfairness of what Aragon is attempting 
to do is shown by the fact that Borden continues to be liable to 
Aragon for workers' compensation benefits. The Compensation 
Agreement explicitly states that the Industrial Commission "shall 
retain continuing jurisdiction to modify awards as provided by 
law." R. 490. After a compensation agreement is entered into it 
is not at all uncommon for the insurance carrier and employers to 
be obligated to pay additional medical expenses, additional 
permanent partial impairment awards, temporary total disability 
due to subsequent surgeries or aggravations, and even permanent 
total compensation awards. Borden is a named employer on Aragon's 
workers' compensation claim, and thus remains exposed to further 
adjustments. Merely considering the fact that Borden, whether 
directly or through its insurance carrier, would have to pay 
Aragon's ongoing medical expenses related to his industrial 
accident while at the same time defending itself against Aragon's 
tort claim to recover those same medical expenses, as well as 
other damages, demonstrates the impropriety of Aragon being 
permitted to go forward with this action. 
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This public policy embodied in the Workers' Compensation 
Act was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Cook v. Peter 
Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616, where the Court 
stated: 
The other important purpose of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, which must be given 
recognition and effect, is that it permits 
employers to pay fees for workmen's 
compensation insurance thereby safeguarding 
themselves against possible disastrous claims 
for injuries which they may not be able to 
bear. This allows employers to so plan and 
manage their affairs as to make the wheels of 
industry run, with its resulting benefits, 
including jobs for employees. Both the giving 
of full effect to the act, and doing justice to 
the employer, require that it be so interpreted 
and applied as to afford the employer the 
intended protection as well as conferring the 
advantages it does upon the employee. 
386 P.2d at 618. 
In Chatterly v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme Court imposed liability on a parent 
corporation for payment of wages due to employees of a subsidiary 
on the grounds that a controlling corporation "should not be 
permitted to manage and operate a business from which it stands to 
gain whatever profit may be made, have the advantage of the 
efforts of those who serve it, and then use the nomenclature of 
another corporation as a facade to insulate it from responsibility 
from paying for such services." 485 P.2d at 670. Surely that 
sword should cut both ways, and Borden as the parent corporation 
which actually provided the benefits in this case should be 
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entitled to the protection intended by the exclusive remedy 
provision. As stated in Adamson v. Okland Const. Co., 29 Utah 2d 
286, 508 P.2d 805, 807 (1983): 
The same liberal test whereby a person in the 
position of an employee may claim benefits from 
an employer should also be applied to provide a 
shield of protection for that statutory 
employer against any asserted liability beyond 
the discharge of obligations under the Workers' 
Compensation statute. 
508 P.2d at 807. See also. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 15 
Utah 2d 20, 286 P.2d 616 (1963) (The Workmen's Compensation "Act 
should be liberally construed and applied to afford coverage to 
the employee and give effect to the purposes of the Act." 386 
P.2d at 617, holding that two companies were a joint venture, and 
so the plaintiff, as employee of one, could not sue the other in 
tort.) 
Other courts have agreed that it is inappropriate to 
impose double liability on a parent corporation in this type of 
situation. In Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 364 N.W.2d 
670 (Mich. 1984), the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed judgment 
prior to trial in favor of the defendant Firestone. In that case 
the plaintiff had been an employee of a Firestone retail store 
owned and operated by "Muskegon Firestone" which was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Firestone. As here, Firestone carried the 
workers* compensation coverage for the employees of Muskegon, and 
the plaintiff had filed for and received benefits from Firestone's 
carrier. All of Muskegon Firestone's directors were employees of 
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Firestone. While, unlike here, Muskegon filed separate tax 
returns, those returns were processed at Firestone's central tax 
department. Additionally, Muskegon Firestone's employees received 
paychecks from Firestone through its central accounting office. 
Here, Aragon and the other Kaysville employees received paychecks 
from Borden's bank account. Balancing all these factors, the 
court found that Firestone, the parent corporation, was the 
plaintiff's employer and was therefore entitled to the protection 
of the exclusive remedy provision. The same result should be 
reached in this case. 
The court in Wells also discussed the important public 
policy basis for its determination: 
The statutory workers' compensation scheme was 
enacted for the protection of both employees 
and employers who work and do business in this 
state. The system assures covered employees 
that they will be compensated in the event of 
employment-related injuries. In addition, 
employers are assured of the parameters of 
their liability for such injuries. By agreeing 
to assume responsibility for all 
employment-related injuries, employers protect 
themselves from the possibility of potentially 
excessive damage awards. In order to 
effectuate these policies, the statute has been 
broadly construed to provide broad coverage for 
injured workers. (Citation omitted.) 
If a statute is to be construed liberally 
when an employee seeks benefits, it should not 
be construed differently when the employer 
asserts it as a defense to a tort action 
brought by the employee who claimed and 
accepted benefits arising from that employment 
relationship. There is absolutely no evidence 
that defendant maintained Muskegon Firestone 
for the purpose of insulating itself from its 
workers* compensation liabilities. Defendant 
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supplied workers' compensation benefits through 
its insurance company and accepted 
responsibility for the work-related injuries of 
its Muskegon employees. Indeed, under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, we would 
not have permitted Firestone to shield itself 
behind its wholly owned subsidiary in order to 
avoid payment of workers' compensation benefits 
to plaintiff. (Citation omitted.) 
364 N.W.2d at 674-675 (Emphasis added). 
The same analysis applies in this case. Borden paid the 
wages, provided the workers' compensation benefits, and controlled 
the work at the Kaysville facility. It should be entitled to its 
end of the workers' compensation bargain. It has already incurred 
the expense of paying for Aragon's workers' compensation 
benefits. It should not also be forced to incur further liability 
on this tort claim. 
C. Borden is Aragon's Common Law Employer. 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), the "immediate, or common law 
employer, who actually pays compensation and its officers, agents, 
and employees are shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity 
conferred by § 35-1-60." ifi. at 431. In this case, there is no 
dispute that the party which paid for the compensation is 
Borden.3 Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Rex Bollinger and 
6
 As discussed earlier, Aragon's attempts to undermine the 
undisputed testimony concerning the source of payment of the 
premiums to Liberty Mutual is of no avail. The testimony is 
proper, and in any event no objection was made to the affidavits 
so as to preserve any objection to the testimony contained in the 
affidavits. 
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Paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Raymond Barkley both state that 
Borden paid the premium, (R. 273/ 269.) Since Borden paid the 
premium, it should be shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. 
Aragon argues that who paid the premium is irrelevant. This 
totally misses the mark. Borden purchased the policy to cover its 
operations. R. 273, 416. It is strong evidence that Borden was 
Aragon's employer. The fact that Borden was a party-defendant 
before the Industrial Commission also shows the true intention of 
the parties — Aragon was employed by both Borden and Clover 
Club. The "inference" that Liberty Mutual would not do an 
unnecessary act in paying benefits on behalf of Borden which 
Aragon argues for at page 37 of his Brief actually cuts in favor 
of Borden's position. The fact that Liberty Mutual acquiesced in 
the Industrial Commission's determination in the Compensation 
Agreement that Borden was an employer of Aragon reflects reality 
— Borden was in fact Aragon's employer. 
It is clear that Borden was his common law employer, as 
shown by: (1) its payment of salary to Aragon; (2) its provision 
of benefits on his behalf; (3) its provision of workers' 
compensation benefits for him; (4) its employment and selection of 
Clover Club's directors; (5) its control over Aragon; and (6) its 
100% ownership of Clover Club. As the trial court stated, "no 
reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts other than that 
Clover Club and Borden acted as Aragon's common law employer. 
(R. 507.) 
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Plaintiff's efforts to raise a question of fact on this 
matter fail because plaintiff is intent on drawing a distinction 
between Borden and Clover Club which simply does not exist. 
Clover Club, as shown by the undisputed evidence, is operated as a 
profit center of Borden. (R. 268.) While the corporation Clover 
Club Foods Company has continued to have an independent existence, 
owns property, and has a board of directors, in terms of the 
day-to-day operations of the Kaysville plant, all employees are 
paid by Borden and supervised by Borden. (R. 267-269.) The fact 
that Borden uses the name "Clover Club" to identify the Kaysville 
operation does not mean that the corporation Clover Club Food 
Company has a particular involvement in the operation of the plant 
other than as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Borden. 
Aragon attempts to argue that because Clover Club was his 
employer therefore Borden cannot be his employer. This ignores 
the fact that there are many instances of multiple, common law 
employers. Professor Larson in his treatise on workmen's 
compensation spends significant time discussing lent employees, 
joint employment, joint business arrangements producing joint 
employment, dual employment, general versus special employment and 
other matters. See e.g., 1C. Larson, § 14.40 ££ seq. Similarly, 
Utah cases have recognized that there are a variety of 
circumstances where more than one entity is the employer for 
workers' compensation purposes. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gibbons & 
Reed/ 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973) (joint venturers and 
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partners are both considered agents of the joint venture and 
therefore immune from suit); Cook v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963). Similarly, there are many cases 
in other states where businesses have been found to be joint 
employers of injured workers. See, e.g., Dildine v. Hunt 
Transportation, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 801 (111. App. 1990) (two wholly 
owned subsidiaries of the same holding company were joint 
employers of injured worker); Robertson v. Stroup, 180 S.2d 617 
(Miss. 1965) (injured worker employed both by filling station 
operator and automobile rental business who employed filling 
station operator). See generally 1C. Larson, § 48.42 (1991). 
There is no legal barrier to the determination that, as the 
Industrial Commission found, and as the trial court determined the 
undisputed facts compelled, Borden and Clover Club were the 
employers of the plaintiff in this case. As the facts stated, 
there is no functional separateness between the corporations, and 
therefore no reason to distinguish one of them as the employer of 
Aragon to the exclusion of the other. 
Aragon's discussion of his intention when he hired on at 
the Kaysville plant is misplaced. The intention to form an 
employee/employer relationship is a relevant issue when trying to 
determine if a person is an employee or an independent 
contractor. It is not significant, however, when there is no 
dispute that an employment relationship was formed and the only 
question is whether one or more of related corporate entities are 
-27-
the employer. It is telling that Aragon did not refuse the award 
of the Industrial Commission against Borden, 
As Aragon*s common law employer, Borden is entitled to 
the protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 
D. Borden is Aragon*s Statutory Employer and Actually Paid 
for the Workers' Compensation Benefits, and So It Should 
be Entitled to the Protection of the Exclusive Remedy 
Provision. 
At the least, it is clear that Borden qualifies as 
Aragon's "statutory employer" since Borden "retained supervision 
or control" over him, and the work he performed was a part or 
process in the trade or business of Borden. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-42(5)(1). Since Aragon's wages, benefits, and overhead 
came out of Borden's funds, and since the income generated by 
Aragon's activities were reported in Borden's consolidated 
financial statements, and were taxed through Borden's tax returns, 
it is clear that Aragon's activities were part of Borden's 
business. 
The question of whether immunity is available for a 
statutory employer who actually paid for workers' compensation 
benefits was left open in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 
428, 431 (Utah 1989). If the Court here determines that Borden is 
properly considered only a statutory employer rather than a common 
law employer, despite the prior determination of the Industrial 
Commission, it is appropriate to rule here that Borden is entitled 
to the exclusive remedy protection. The purpose of the broad 
definition of statutory employer in § 35-1-42 is to ensure that 
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there are adequate employers available to be liable for payment of 
workers' compensation benefits. The teaching of Patq, supra, and 
Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc.. 777 P.2d 431 (Utah 1989), is 
that when in fact the workers' compensation benefits were provided 
by the subcontractor/employer there is no reason to extend 
immunity to the unrelated general contractor who did not provide 
the workers' compensation benefits. Conversely, here Borden was 
intimately wrapped up in the work Aragon did, paid his wages, and 
actually paid for the workers' compensation benefits. Borden 
should not also be exposed to tort liability arising out of the 
same work-related injury. 
E. Borden is at Least the Agent of Clover Club and Therefore 
Entitled to Protection of the Exclusive Remedy Provision. 
The trial court found that both Borden and Clover Club 
were the common law employers of Aragon. Aragon has not appealed 
the court's decision as to Clover Club, and in fact argues in his 
brief that Clover Club was his employer.4 While the existence 
of Clover Club as Aragon's employer does not preclude finding 
that Borden also qualifies as Aragon's employer, see Parts B and 
C supra/ it provides another compelling reason which mandates 
affirmance of the trial court's ruling. 
q
 This fact coupled with the fact that he alleged that Borden or 
Clover Club was his employer in all of the complaints in this case 
give rise to questions as to the appropriateness of the plaintiff 
having ever named these defendants. 
-29-
It is clear that workers' compensation is the exclusive 
remedy against an employer and "against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 
(emphasis added). While Aragon argues that Borden is not his 
employer, how can he seriously contend that Borden, at the very 
least, is not Clover Club's agent? 
If the Court were to determine that the employees of the 
Kaysville facility were exclusively Clover Club employees and not 
employees of Borden (which finding would be totally unsupported by 
the undisputed facts) then the legal relationship between Borden 
and Clover Club must be one of agency as well as of parent 
corporation and subsidiary. The undisputed facts show that Borden 
paid the wages of the employees at the Kaysville facility. 
(R. 268.) Additionally, Borden paid for and provided the benefits 
package. Borden also provided and paid for workers' compensation 
protection. (R. 268, 269.) Moreover, Borden prepared tax returns 
and paid for Clover Club's tax liabilities. (R. 268.) All of 
these items are tasks usually performed by the employer. Where, 
as here, another entity performs them, that entity (Borden) must 
be considered the agent of the principal (Clover Club). While 
certainly Clover Club acts as Borden's agent in some instances, 
there is nothing to prevent Borden acting as Clover Club's agent 
at the same time. In this case the undisputed facts show that 
Borden has provided substantial services and benefits to Clover 
Club and acts on Clover Club's behalf in many ways that are 
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closely related to its relations with its employees. These 
substantial benefits and services related very specifically to 
Aragon. The record clearly permits a finding as a matter of law 
that Borden was acting as an agent of Clover Club, and therefore 
Borden is entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy 
provision. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED AND IS 
NOT A BAR TO AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
an avenue for parties to obtain additional time to conduct 
discovery in response to a summary judgment motion. Generally 
speaking, the Rule 56(f) requests "should be liberally treated, 
unless dilatory or lacking in merit. (Citations omitted.) It is 
for the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, to 
determine if the reasons stated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit are 
adequate." Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, Aragon filed two strikingly similar Rule 
56(f) motions. The first was in response to the motion to dismiss 
Borden and Clover Club filed in September 1990. In the first Rule 
56(f) affidavit plaintiff's attorney stated that plaintiff 
believes "he needs further information relating to the legal 
relationship between Clover Club Foods and Borden, Inc." That 
motion and affidavit were dated September 13, 1990. (R. 134-135, 
119-121.) Ultimately, Clover Club's motion to dismiss was not 
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ruled upon. The court's scheduling order dated April 26, 1991, 
which was prepared by Aragon's counsel (R. 226-228), stated that 
defendants would withdraw their motion to dismiss, Aragaon would 
withdraw his Rule 56(f) motion, and defendants would file a motion 
for summary judgment by May 1, 1991. Borden subsequently got an 
extension until May 8, 1991, to file its motion for summary 
judgment. It filed this motion, and Aragon filed a memorandum in 
opposition on June 4, 1991. Aragon also filed another Rule 56(f) 
motion together with another affidavit from his attorney also 
dated June 4, 1991. (R 290-292, 293, 294-297.) In that Rule 
56(f) affidavit, Aragon's attorney stated that they needed five 
items of information. All of those items related to the issues 
concerning the alter ego claim. See R. 291, 295. The trial court 
stated in its Ruling that the "tangential question of piercing the 
corporate veil need not be addressed." (R. 507.) Clearly no 
alleged fact question or discovery dispute related to an issue 
which was not addressed in the lower court's decision can give 
rise to grounds for reversal. 
Essentially, the information sought related to the same 
general issue raised in plaintiff's first Rule 56(f) motion, which 
had been filed more than eight months earlier. Even after the 
second Rule 56(f) motion was filed, plaintiff did not do any of 
the discovery sought in the motion in the nearly two months prior 
to the hearing date set for the summary judgment motion. 
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In Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990), the Supreme 
Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant and 
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
a second motion for continuance under Rule 56(f). The Court noted 
that in that case: 
Ample time was allowed after commencement of 
the lawsuit to utilize discovery procedures. 
(Citations omitted.) Moreover the trial court 
vacated one summary judgment thereby giving the 
plaintiff an additional five months to gather 
additional evidence. Hunt clearly had time to 
conduct the necessary discovery. Given the 
fact that the trial court vacated the first 
summary judgment and allowed five months for 
additional discovery, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Hunt's motion. 
785 P.2d at 416. 
In this case, Borden's summary judgment motion was filed 
approximately a year after the complaint was filed in state court, 
and about 18 months after the case was initially filed in federal 
court. Moreover, the second Rule 56(f) motion was filed 
approximately nine months after Borden's previous motion to 
dismiss was filed, which also raised the exclusive remedy issue, 
and which also elicited a Rule 56(f) request for additional time. 
Clearly Aragon had ample time between May of 1990 and the hearing 
in late July of 1991 to conduct whatever discovery he wished 
concerning the relationship between Borden and Clover Club. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 56(f) 
motion. 
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More importantly, the court also did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion where, as here, there was no 
connection between the information sought in the Rule 56(f) motion 
and the grounds for the ruling. Numerous Utah cases have held 
that Rule 56(f) motions should be denied if they are dilatory or 
without merit. See e.g., Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 
P.2d 838, 840 (Utah App. 1987); Strand v. Associated Students of 
the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977). First, 
nothing in the Rule 56(f) motion was directed at anything relating 
to the assertions of res judicata and collateral estoppel caused 
by the determination in the Compensation Agreement that Borden and 
Clover Club were Aragon's employers. None of the information 
described in the Rule 56(f) motion would have any impact on the 
determination as to whether plaintiff is precluded from asserting 
either a claim against Borden or re-litigating the issue of his 
employment with Borden. Second, none of that information raises a 
dispute to the undisputed and unobjected to evidence provided by 
Borden that it paid the wages of Aragon and others at the 
Kaysville facility, and that it had control over him. Therefore, 
the requested information would not impact the determination that 
Borden was a common law employer of Aragon. Third, it does not 
impact the determination that Borden at least acts as an agent for 
Clover Club in some respects and therefore is entitled to 
protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 
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Where the Rule 56(f) motion was made months after 
plaintiff should have been aware of whatever issues he wished to 
pursue, and there were multiple grounds for granting summary 
judgment unrelated to the facts plaintiff sought to discover, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and 
in granting summary judgment in favor of Borden. Accordingly, the 
denial of that motion provides no basis for reversal in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed. The 
record clearly compels the conclusion that Borden is entitled to 
the protection of the exclusive remedy provision, and that 
Aragon's claims against it must be dismissed. Aragon has asserted 
and obtained relief against Borden through the workers' 
compensation system, and the issue of the identity of his employer 
has been determined through an award of the Industrial Commission 
which was not disputed. This alone is fatal to Aragon's claims. 
Additionally, it is clear that Borden qualifies in fact 
as Aragon's common law employer, or alternatively as the agent of 
his common law employer. The denial of the Rule 56(f) motion was 
not an abuse of discretion, and in any event cannot be a harmful 
error due to the independent grounds on which the summary judgment 
may be granted and affirmed. 
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Appellees Borden and Clover Club respectfully requests 
that the Court affirm the order of the trial court granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1992. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Al 
(urn*. tf$zu<At&ff^ 
Ian T. Brinkerhoff // 
Steven J . ^(eschbacher 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents Clover 
Club Foods Co. and Borden Inc, 
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175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX "A 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; CX. 1917, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Employment of chil-
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 35-2-1 et seq. 
Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
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COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTJAH v J ^ 
JAMES M. ARAGON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. \ 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
| RULING ON MOTION 
| FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
| Civil No. 900747717 
The defendants' motions for summary judgment came before the 
Court on a notice to submit for decision. The Court has 
received written memoranda from the defendants in support of 
their motions for summary judgment and from the plaintiff in 
opposition. The plaintiff is represented by Douglas M. Durbano 
and Paul H. Johnson and the defendants by Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
and Steven W. Call for Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, 
Inc., along with Jay E. Jensen for Casa Herrera, Inc. 
Defendants' two motions for summary judgment are granted. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact in either motion. 
The facts in the case are not complicated. Plaintiff James 
M. Aragon, ("Aragon") began working for Clover Club Foods 
Company ("Clover Club"), a subsidiary of Borden, Inc. 
("Borden"), on December 3, 1985. Aragon was assigned to clean a 
mesa feeder machine on his first day of work. Aragon cleaned 
the mesa feeder machine each day from December 3, 1985, through 
December 16, 1985. On December 16, 1985, Aragon began to clean 
the mesa feeder. Aragon suffered a double compound fracture to 
his left arm, having since undergone significant medical care 
and treatment. Aragon7s employers, Clover Club and Borden 
relied on an insurance premium and Worker's Compensation to 
cover Aragon's medical and disability expenses. Aragon sued his 
employers, claiming that Borden is a third party tortfeasor who 
acted negligently in supplying the mesa feeder machine to Clover 
Club. 
The issue in this case concerns whether defendants, Borden 
and Clover Club were the common law employers of Aragon under 
the Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act on December 16, 1985. If Clover Club and 
Borden were the common law employers of Aragon on December 16, 
1985, then Aragon's exclusive remedy is confined to Worker's 
Compensation. However, if Clover Club and Borden were not the 
common law employers of Aragon on December 16, 1985, Aragon may 
attempt to sue Clover Club or Borden as a third party tortfeasor 
according to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62(a) of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the plain meaning of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's Compensation 
Act, on back-to-back cases in 1989. In Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
deemed the legislative language of Section 35-1-60 to be clear 
and unequivocal. The language of Section 3 5-1-60 permits suits 
by injured workers against statutory employers but not immediate 
common law employers. Id. The Pate court defined a common law 
employer as the one who actually pays the wages of the 
employee. Id. 
In the second case decided on the same date, Bosch v. Bursch 
Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court further defined what constitutes a common law 
employer. A common law employer is required to pay the 
employee's Worker's Compensation benefits. Id. at 432. An 
employer who does not pay the employee's Worker's Compensation 
benefits is deemed a statutory employer. Id. A statutory 
employer who fails to pay the employee's Worker's Compensation 
benefits is denied statutory immunity from an employee's suit as 
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42(2) of the 
Workers's Compensation Act. Id. 
The rule of law which clarifies Utah legislation in Pate and 
Bosch defines a common law employer as one who pays the 
employee's wages and Worker's Compensation benefits. Applying 
this common law employer rule to the facts in the instant case, 
Clover Club and Borden constitute a common law employer. On 
December 17, 1985, Aragon submitted his initial worker's 
compensation claim to his employer's claims adjuster. The claim 
prepared by Aragon listed both defendants Clover Club and Borden 
as his employers. The insurance carrier which handles claims 
for Clover Club and Borden listed both Clover Club and Borden as 
Aragon's employers in filing an answer to the Utah State 
Industrial Commission on September 2, 1986. Lastly, Aragon's 
final compensation agreement approved by an administrative law 
judge on August 14, 1987, for the Utah State Industrial 
Commission listed both Clover Club and Borden as Aragon's 
employers. The administrative law judge ordered Clover Club and 
Borden, as Aragon's employers, to pay disability wages of more 
than $16,000 and medical expenses in excess of $45,000 to 
Aragon. Thus, for having paid Aragon's wages and Worker's 
Compensation benefits, both Clover Club and Borden constitute 
the common law employers of Aragon. 
Because Clover Club and Borden are Aragon's common law 
employers, Aragon is limited to the exclusive remedy of Utah 
Code Annotated of the Worker's Compensation Act as provided for 
in Section 35-1-60. Since Aragon already has received wages and 
medical expenses as his remedy from the Utah State Industrial 
Commission, no factual issue remains. To permit Aragon to 
continue to seek relief from his employers, Clover Club and 
Borden, would preclude a finality to litigation. More 
significantly, plaintiff's employer is entitled to relief on the 
basis of res judicata. The matter already has been adjudicated. 
Aragon, while conceding no genuine fact is materially 
disputed, nonetheless argues that the undisputed facts are 
subject to divergent interpretations. On the basis of such 
divergent interpretations, the motion for summary judgment by 
Clover Club and Borden, should be denied. However, no 
reasonable inference other than that Clover Club and Borden 
acted as Aragon's common law employer can be drawn from the 
facts. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Helgar Ranch, 
Inc. v. Stillmen, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980), made clear 
that a motion for summary judgment is denied only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted. No facts in the 
instant case are uncontroverted by either party. For example, 
Aragon received a letter from Clover Club in May 20, 1987, that 
contained an offer to buy health insurance from Borden. 
Throughout the letter, Clover Club made clear that the insurance 
offer came from Borden. This May 20, 1987, letter was supplied 
by Aragon. Aragon kenw or had reason to know that both Clover 
Club and Borden had acted as his employers. 
The tangential question of piercing the corporate veil need 
not be addressed. The Utah Supreme Court in Page and Bosch made 
clear that the sole question on whether Clover Club or Borden 
are third party tortfeasors or the employee's common law 
employers turns on whether the defendants pay the employee's 
wages and Worker's Compensation benefits. The facts in this 
case clearly indicate that Clover Club and Borden are common law 
employers and further actions by Aragon is barred. Thus, as a 
matter 'of law, the motion for summary judgment, made by Clover 
Club and Borden is granted. 
Regarding the motion for summary judgment made by defendant, 
Casa Herrera, Inc., the facts are uncontroverted. James Aragon 
sustained a serious injury on December 16, 1985, while cleaning 
a mesa feeder at Clover Club in Davis County. Aragon commenced 
a cause of action against Casa Herrera on September 24, 1990. 
In other words, Aragon did not exercise his right to seek a 
remedy against Casa Herrera, Inc., until approximately four and 
three-fourth years after he sustained serious injuries while 
working at Clover Club. 
The lapse of more than four years in filing a complaint 
raises the question as to what statutory section governs the 
commencing of a personal injury tort action. Aragon claims to 
have six years to file from the date of purchase of the 
allegedly defective machine or up to ten years from the date of 
manufacture. Aragon relies on Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-15-3 which in fact provided from six to ten years for filing 
a complaint. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 727 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) found Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-15-3 to be a statute of repose. Id. at 
672. A statute of repose is per se unconstitutional for 
violating Article I, Section 11 of the Utah State 
Constitution. Id. The Berry court reasoned that Section 
78-15-3 would deny a plaintiff a cause of action merely because 
the plane which had crashed and caused the death of its 
passengers was more than ten years old. Id. Any statute that 
bars a plaintiff a cause of action without regard to when the 
injury occurs is a statute of repose and hence 
unconstitutional. Id. at 679. Thus, Aragon may not use a 
statute of repose as a basis for determining when his right of 
action may toll. 
Casa Herrera, Inc., correctly refers to Utah Code, Section 
78-12-25 (1953 & Supp. 1975), for determining when a cause of 
action tolls. Section 78-12-25, in effect in 1985, covers tort 
actions for personal injuries and grants plaintiffs up to four 
years to file a complaint with the courts. Section 78-12-25 
meets the constitutional requirements set out by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Berry. For, the section takes into account 
when the injury occurs as a basis for determining how long a 
plaintiff has to file a cause of action. 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its Berry litmus test for 
determining the constitutionality of statute code sections in 
Riathaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, 789 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 
1989). The Riathaus court noted how statutes of limitations 
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights to the 
detriment of defendants. Id. at 1160. As a statute of 
limitation, Section 78-12-25 gives plaintiff four years to 
commence a cause of action. 
Applying the Berry and Riathaus holdings along with the 
proper code Section 78-12-25 to the instant case, Aragon was 
injured on Decmeber 16, 1985. Aragon sued Casa Herrera, Inc., 
on September 24, 1990, which exceeds the statutory limit by 
approximately nine months. Aragon7s suit against defendant Casa 
Herrera, Inc., is time barred. As a matter of law, then Casa 
Herrera, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is granted. 
The defendants, Clover Club and Borden, are ordered to draw 
a formal order based on this opinion. 
Dated July 31, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Paul H. Johnson 
Douglas M. Durbano 
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
Steven W. Call 
310 So Main St, 12th Floor 
SLC, Utah 84101 
Jay E. Jensen 
M. Douglas Bayly 
175 So West Temple, Suite 510 
SLC, Utah 84101 
Dated this ,^/i d day of August 1991. 
Deputy Clerk 
APPENDIX "C" 
James,, ZSLXI • * . C>-/?/$ /-C& 
Atml I r a n i ) * ! *- - " -"- - ' pplic t) 
Clover Cltih FnnH. r.n I TK^A^ and * COMPENSATION 
(Employer) * . ACKEEMENt: 
a . . " ; ' . 
Liberty Mutual Tnsnrflnrp Hn - * • . - * . - -
(Insurance Carrier) (C667-24386 R) * 
Defendants. . * . ^6""> 
U ?>/. 
ft 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
WHEREAS, James Aragnn sustained a personal injury by 
accident arising out of or in the course of employment on the 16th day of December , 
19JLL while employed by clover m»K V ^ A ? rc / Borden • *hich tccident has 
been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah. According to the 
physician's reports and agreement between the parties hereto, said Applicant sustained, as 
a result of said accident, temporary total disability and/or permanent partial disability, 
as well as Incurring medical and/or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth: 
1. Temporary total disability from l?/l7/fts to 5 ;5 /S7 ; 
payable at the rate of X 128.00 per week for a total of % 6290.29 
$. 
$. 
%m 
%m 
A| 
4^ ,0^7 16 
V\XW\1 \L 
1 fS. ?74 79 
6 ( f tn? 9Q 
>ensatlon 
jreement: 
• - 0 
| 9472.00 
$ 9472.00 
has. been Incurred and the carrier/employer has paid a total of % 6290.29 • 
of which the following amount was taxed: $ _ Q **. 
2. ^Permanent partial disability based on 7fi weeks payable at the rate of 
*
 128
-°0 per week beginning fr/15/87 for a total of <998/, 00 
and % 512.00 nas Deen *dv&nced thereunto, of which I_Q was taxed**. 
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows: 
25% whole man 
3. Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid In connection with this claim: 
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous incurred 
Paid to date 
Balance (If any) due 
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits due 
Paid to date 
Balance (If any) due 
(c) Total Hedical ar»2 Compensation due per this Compensati
g ent
Pursuant to UCA 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund will reimburse the carrier/employer, 
N/A . * of all temporary total disability compensation and 
medical expenses paid on this claim and will pay the applicant weeks of compensa-
tion at the rate of $ for an Impairment of _ _ 
for a total of % . 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amounts stated in Section 3 
above — as provided by law — the Applicant hereby accepts the compensation and Medical 
payments paid to date and agrees with the permanent partial disability rating shown above. 
However, the Industrial Commission of Utah shall retain continuing jurisdiction to modify 
awards as provided by law. Medical expenses incurred as a result of the industrial acci-
dent are the continuing obligation of the insurance carrier or employer. 
It is understood that this agreement becomes binding and effective only when It is 
approved by the Industrial Commission. 
525-21-31?'* ( JGL^?i/^ /&. (' 's/Cc^y*ZJ7 7 
Employee's Social Security Number. -Signature of Applicant- Jame^Aragon CiQ/j 
^ ~ —(UIUM fi^ihm^' 
Signature ot Insurance^ Carrier/Employer Tracy Birdson* 
N/A 
Signature of Second Injury Fund Administrator 
The above Compensation has been reviewed and Is approved by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Attorney's fees of i 1420. 80 should be deducted from the amounts owing and paid 
by the carrier/employer to Douglas VL. D u r b a n n ^ R ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v r ^ ^ p ^ g ^ ^ ^ Q ^ Q ^
 T C A 
Approved this / y **y of 
198H ~ J ^^AUMINISTR 
NOTE: COMPENSATION IS TAX EXEMPT PER SECTION 6334 <A) tfY OF SECTION 26, U. S. CODE. 
Original will be returned to carrier/employer and signed copy to employee. Remember 
enclosures of Forms 122, 123, 141, and documents showing rating(s) by doctor(s). 
